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Abstract— In order to automate the analysis of SCADA and 
digital fault recorder (DFR) data for a transmission network 
operator in the UK, the authors have developed an industrial 
strength multi-agent system entitled Protection Engineering 
Diagnostic Agents (PEDA). The PEDA system integrates a 
number of legacy intelligent systems for analyzing power system 
data as autonomous intelligent agents. The integration achieved 
through multi-agent systems technology enhances the diagnostic 
support offered to engineers by focusing the analysis on the most 
pertinent DFR data based on the results of the analysis of 
SCADA.  
Since November 2004 the PEDA system has been operating 
online at a UK utility. In this paper the authors focus on the 
underlying intelligent system techniques, i.e. rule-based expert 
systems, model-based reasoning and state-of-the-art multi-agent 
system technology, that PEDA employs and the lessons learnt 
through its deployment and online use.  
 
Index Terms— Multi-agent systems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he proliferation of monitoring equipment on transmission 
and distribution networks has resulted in an ever-
increasing amount of data being made available to utility 
engineers. Data provided by Supervisory, Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Digital Fault Recorders 
(DFR), microprocessor-based protection relays with fault 
recording capabilities, travelling-wave fault locators, and 
circuit breaker condition monitoring systems, can aid 
engineers in making more informed, and potentially more 
profitable, power system operations and asset management 
decisions. However, there are a number of barriers to the 
effective use of this data:  
• The raw data is often uninformative: information relating 
to plant health or the performance of the power system is 
implicit rather than explicit; and 
• The volume of data, especially under storm conditions, 
renders manual analysis intractable. 
The requirement for tools and techniques to automate the 
analysis of different types of power systems data has driven 
research into the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for the best 
part of two decades [1-12]. As important, although less fully 
explore in the literature, is the fact the all the data sets above 
are related; they all contain data relating to how the power 
system reacts to disturbances. When performing analysis 
manually, engineers tend to take a holistic approach by 
analysing all the available data. Consider the post-fault 
diagnosis process as carried out by engineers at SP 
PowerSystems, the transmission system operator in central 
and southern Scotland:  
1. Engineers begin by identifying occurrence of disturbances 
or ‘incidents’ from SCADA data. Some aspects of 
protection operation can be validated from SCADA, e.g. 
missing protection alarms or inter-trip alarms may suggest 
that part of the scheme failed to operate. 
2. Knowledge of the occurrence of an incident is used to 
focus the retrieval and analysis of fault recorder data. As 
recorders are triggered on a depression in voltage, a large 
number of recorders across the network may capture data. 
Engineers are primarily interested in the DFR data from 
the faulted circuit. 
3. After all the fault records pertaining the incident have been 
retrieved the engineers analyse the data, classifying the 
type of disturbances, calculating the fault clearance time, 
determining an approximate fault location based on 
calculated impedance, and validating that protection 
operated as expected. 
4. Travelling wave fault locator records are also retrieved for 
the faulted circuit and the distance to fault calculated. 
5. Circuit breaker conditioning monitoring data may also be 
analysed to assess breaker operation. 
The result of the process above is the comprehensive 
analysis of the reaction of the protection system to the 
disturbance or fault based on a range of data sources. 
However, data volumes make performing this process 
manually time-consuming and thus costly: automation is 
required.  
Automating the analysis of a variety of data sets and then 
collating the results in a meaningful manner is complicated by 
a number of factors: 
• Data are stored in a variety of proprietary formats in 
different systems in different physical locations; 
• Different techniques are best suited to analysis of 
different data sets; 
• The information resulting from one type of analysis can 
be used to focus subsequent analyses. For example, 
knowing when and on what circuit an incident has 
occurred, as derived from SCADA, allows DFR data to 
be partitioned and the most pertinent records identified 
based on time-of-capture and location.   
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• Analysis tools and data sources are liable to change over 
time as new data sourced become available and analysis 
techniques ameliorated. In other words, there is a 
requirement for flexible and extensible software 
architectures. 
 When building a practical automated post-fault analysis 
system the authors’ approach was to use multi-agent system 
(MAS) technology to integrate a set of industry-strength 
legacy intelligent systems. The choice of MAS technology 
was primarily motivated by the flexibility and extensibility it 
offers [10][11].  
While multi-agent technology provides a framework for 
automating the entire post-fault analysis process, the quality of 
PEDA’s analyses is predicated on the efficacy of the 
intelligent systems the agents encapsulate. This paper focuses 
on the underlying AI techniques that PEDA exploits, the state-
of-the-art MAS technology employed, mechanisms for 
delivering information to engineers in an effective and timely 
manner, and the practical experience of deploying a system 
robust enough for use in the power industry. 
The paper begins with a brief description of the PEDA 
system, which has been operating online at SP PowerSystems, 
since November 2004, before discussion of the individual 
analysis techniques.  
II. PROTECTION ENGINEERING DIAGNOSTIC AGENTS 
PEDA (fig. 1) was designed to automate steps 1-3 of the 
post-fault analysis process described in the introduction to this 
paper. To do so, PEDA employs the following agents: 
• An Incident and Event Identification (IEI) Agent:  this 
agent ‘wraps’ a rule-based expert system that identifies 
power system incidents, such as disturbances and 
switching operations, from ‘live’ SCADA data. When an 
incident occurs the IEI agent uses the expert system to 
identify the relevant alarms, classify the type of incident 
and assess some aspects of protection operation. 
• Fault Record Retrieval (FRR) Agents: the FRR agent 
connects to the utility’s fault record database and makes 
new records available to other agents. 
• A Fault Record Interpretation (FRI) Agent: the FRI 
agent ‘wraps’ a rule-based expert system for classifying 
and interpreting DFR data.  
• A Protection Validation and Diagnosis (PVD) Agent: 
the PVD agent ‘wraps’ a model-based reasoning engine 
that employs models of the protection system to validation 
protection performance. 
• A Collation Agent (CA): The collation agent (CA) 
gathers information from the agents above and archives it 
in a database accessible via an intranet site. This intranet 
site gives engineers access to the latest information 
provided by the PEDA agents and also allows them to 
explore historical data for particular circuits as well as 
download and view fault records on their local desktop 
PC. 
• Engineering Assistant Agents (EAA): PEDA uses 
engineering assistant agents to provide tailored post-fault 
analysis information to engineers. 
The agents automate post-fault diagnosis through social 
interactions. When a fault record is retrieved via auto polling, 
the FRR agent sends a message asking the IEI agent if any 
incidents occurred at the time the record was captured. The 
IEI agent then sends the details of any incidents that occurred 
at that time to the FRR agent. The FRR agent can then classify 
how the record is related to the incident. Records can be 
classified as:  
• Directly related to an incident: a fault record captured 
during an incident from the end of the circuit involved in 
that incident. 
• Related to an incident: a fault record captured during an 
incident from a substation that contains one of the ends of 
the circuit involved in the incident, however the record 
does not contain data from that particular circuit. 
• Indirectly related to an incident: a fault record captured 
during an incident by a fault recorder in substation that 
was not directly involved in the incident. The fault 
recorder has triggered or been cross-triggered because of 
the voltage depression created by the disturbance.  
• Miscellaneous fault record: a fault record that cannot be 
associated with an incident, i.e. no incidents occurred at 
the time the record was captured. 
By performing the first-cut classification above, it is 
possible to quickly identify and highlight the fault records that 
are of immediate interest to protection engineers, i.e. records 
that are directly related to incidents, without having to analyze 
the content of the record.  
The FRR agent then informs the FRI agent of the existence 
new record.  The FRI and PVD agents can then perform their 
analysis and archive their results with the Collation Agent. 
Full details of these agent interactions can be found in [13] 
[14]. 
IEI
Agent
FRR
Agent
FRI
Agent
PVD
Agent
CA
Engineering
Assistant
Agent
PEDA
Database
SCADA Digital Fault Records
13:54:14:720 SUBA SUBB   Unit Protection Optd       ON
13:54:14:730 SUBA SUBB   Trip Relays Optd             ON
13:54:14:760 SUBA SUBB   Second Intertrip Optd      ON
13:54:14:760 SUBA cb1       OPEN
13:54:37:710 SUBB cb2       CLOSED
13:54:38:300 SUBA cb1       CLOSED
PEDA
Figure 1: The PEDA multi-agent system 
 
The agents were implemented using the Java Agent 
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Development Environment [15] (JADE) and adhere to 
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) standards 
[16]. These standards provided a common agent 
communication language (FIPA-ACL) and an ‘open’ system 
architecture, allowing agents to be added and removed as and 
when required. They also promote interoperability with other 
multi-agent systems. 
Ultimately, PEDA offers the protection engineer a list of 
power systems incidents derived from SCADA data, along 
with the interpreted DFR data and model-based analysis of 
any protection operation for each of the incidents. Through 
the PEDA intranet site, engineers can browse through 
analyses, make amendments and corrections, and get access to 
the raw data should it be required.  
Historical data illustrates the effectiveness of the PEDA 
approach. In 2003 the fault recorder network captured 20,000 
fault records yet only 66 disturbances occurred over the 
course of the year. Through the automated analysis of over 3 
million SCADA alarms, PEDA was able identify the 66 
incidents and partition the DFR data to identify the 1800 
records of most importance before carrying out the in depth 
analysis using the FRI and PVD agents. Tests with historical 
data have also illustrated PEDA’s ability to analyse data 
during storm conditions. For example, a storm in early 2002 
caused a major disruption of supply in central Scotland. The 
SCADA system generated 15,000 alarms and the DFR 
network captured 1695 fault records in a 24-hour period. 
PEDA correctly identified 166 incidents from the SCADA, 
the majority occurring in a 4-hour period, and partitioned the 
DFR data accordingly [13]. 
Since November 2004 PEDA has been operating online at 
the utility. The results of the online trial of PEDA have 
already been reported in the literature [14]. These initial 
results illustrate the effectiveness of the approach and the 
robustness of the agents developed using agent development 
toolkits [17], a robustness that, as described in [13], was 
previously lacking.  
While MAS technology provides a framework for building 
complex hybrid intelligent systems, PEDA’s success is 
predicated on the underlying intelligent systems the agents 
encapsulate.   
III. ALARM PROCESSING FOR INCIDENT AND EVENT 
IDENTIFICATION 
PEDA’s IEI agent uses a legacy alarm processor, entitled 
the Telemetry Processor, to automate the analysis of SCADA 
data. The Telemetry Processor was developed using a classic 
knowledge engineering approach. Knowledge was elicited 
from the utility’s engineers of how they analysed SCADA 
data after a major disturbance. Fig. 2 illustrates the multi-stage 
process they employed: 
 
Stage 1 -  Identify the incident circuit and inception time by 
scanning the alarms for a pattern indicating incident 
inception, i.e. protection relay operation followed 
by a circuit breaker opening.  
Stage 2 -  Group the incident alarms by selecting the next 
alarm after incident inception which has not already 
been checked. Perform a topology check of the 
alarm against the incident circuit recording a 
matching alarm as part of the incident.  
Stage 3 -  Scan the already grouped alarms for patterns 
indicating incident conclusion, e.g. the end of a 
DAR sequence. If no conclusion is identified move 
back to stage 2. This iterative process continues 
until the incident has been concluded. 
Stage 4 -  Scan the grouped incident alarms to identify which 
protection scheme components operated and when. 
Each operation is recorded as a low-level event and 
an event summary generated. 
Stage 5 -  The grouped alarms and low-level events are then 
analysed to group related events and identify 
whether all expected low-level events occurred. 
The results are recorded as high-level event 
summaries. 
 
Stage 1 – Identify
Incident Inception
Stage 2 - Incident 
Alarm Grouping
Stage 4- Low-level
Event Identification
Stage 5 - High-level
Event Identification
SCADA
Circuit &
Inception 
Time
Low-Level
Events
High-Level
Events
Retrieve Alarms
& Begin Analysis
Incident Report
Look for next
Incident
Stage 3 – Identify
Incident Conclusion
Concluded Incident 
& Grouped Alarms
No
Conclusion
 
Fig. 2. Manual analysis of SCADA data. 
 
The Telemetry Processor automates the analysis process 
above using the knowledge elicited from engineers. It adopts a 
reasoning technique employing multiple reasoning streams 
(Fig. 3). Each reasoning stream is implemented as an 
inference engine using knowledge appropriate to each alarm 
analysis stage. The knowledge is stored as production rules in 
separate knowledge bases to allow easy maintenance. 
A single inference engine is permanently devoted to stage 1 
with additional inference engines being created for each 
identified incident inception to manage stages 3 to 5. These 
incident inference engines are transient and only exist until 
alarm interpretation has concluded for the identified incident. 
To manage the multiple inference engines and perform stage 2 
the overall reasoning technique is separated into a control and 
inference layer as illustrated in Fig.3. The control layer 
controls each inference engine independently, supplying data 
to and retrieving data from each inference engine.  
The Telemetry Processor was implemented using Java 
programming language and the JESS expert system shell [18]. 
The output, an incident report (Fig. 4) containing details of the 
incident, i.e. all the events which occurred during the incident 
IEEE PES PSACE Panel Paper- General Meeting 2006 
 
4
and the high level summary generated in stage 5, is stored in a 
database which engineers can access using a web browser via 
the corporate intranet.  
Importantly, the Telemetry Processor operates online. 
Engineers, on the other hand, analysed the data after all the 
alarms had been received and placed in the correct order. As 
the Telemetry Processor has to deal with a ‘live’ SCADA 
feed, there was a knowledge gap that needed to be bridged in 
order to deal with data skew and the ordering of alarms. 
Parse alarm and
add to buffer
Create new incidents
New
Incident Starts?
Monitor for new
alarm
Add alarm to matching
open incidents
Alarm
part of any open
Incidents?
Any incidents
Concluded?
Non-Concluded
Incidents
Concluded
Incidents
Incident
Starts
Alarm
Buffer
Alarm stream
Incident Start
Rulebase
Archive Concluded
Incidents
Alarms
Incident Conclusion
Rulebase
Incident Engines
Incident Identification Engine
Trigger Low-level
Event Identification
Control Inference
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
alarm
Trigger High-level
Event Identification
Low-level Event
Rulebase
High-level Event
Rulebase
(low)
(high)
incident
starts
incident
conclusion
low-level
events
high-level
events
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
Pre-process
Incident Inference Engines
 
Fig. 3. Telemetry Processor Reasoning Engines 
Incident:      “DISTANCE PROT OPTD – SUBB / SUBA: Autoreclose Complete”
START TIME = 14:20:39.07
FINISH TIME = 14:20:39.28
Low-Level  14:20:39.07  “Distance protection operated ON at SUBB -> SUBA”
14:20:39.10  “Autoreclose in progress at SUBB CB2”
14:20:39.13  “SUBB CB2 OPEN”
14:20:39.16  “ Distance protection operated OFF at SUBB -> SUBA”
14:20:39.21  “1st Intertrip received ON at SUBA from SUBB”
14:20:39.21  “2nd Intertrip received ON at SUBA from SUBB”
14:20:39.22  “SUBA circuit breaker CB3 OPEN”
14:20:39.23  “Autoreclose in progress at SUBA CB1”
14:20:39.24  “SUBA circuit breaker CB1 OPEN”
14:20:39.26  “Autoreclose in progress at SUBA CB3”
14:20:39.28  “Autoreclose sequence at SUBB CB2  took 180 ms
14:20:39.28  “Autoreclose sequence complete at SUBB CB2”
High-Level 14:20:39.07  “Distance protection operated successfully at SUBB -> SUBA”
14:20:39.21  “1st and 2nd Intertrips received at SUBA from SUBB”
14:20:39.21  “No protection operation at SUBA on circuit SUBB”
14:20:39.28  “Unit protection at SUBB -> SUBA failed to operate”
 
Fig. 4. Telemetry Protection output  
 
The Telemetry Processor was installed at SP PowerSystems 
as a standalone system in July 2003. It processes the SCADA 
data as soon as it arrives from the Energy Management 
System (EMS). In a typical day, it deals with between 10,000 
and 20,000 alarms. In terms of speed, incident information 
was made available to engineers over the corporate intranet 
within one or two minutes of the conclusion of an incident.  
By the time the Telemetry Processor was incorporated into 
the PEDA architecture as the IEI agent, there was already in 
excess of a year’s operational experience with the system. 
IV. EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR FAULT RECORD INTERPRETATION 
Over the last 15 years a number of different approaches to 
automating the analysis of DFR data have appear in the 
literature [6][7]. Most common is the rule-based expert system 
approach as typified by the work of Kezunovic et al [7]. Many 
manufacturers already offer products for the automatic 
classification of fault records.  
The FRI agent encapsulates an expert system for classifying 
fault records that the authors developed as part of a previous 
project. The expert system reads in COMTRADE data and 
extracts the following information from the record: 
• The fault classification, e.g. red-blue fault; 
• The fault inception time; and 
• The fault clearance time. 
This expert system also transforms COMTRADE data into 
the format required by the model-based reasoning engine 
described in the next section. 
V. VALIDATING PROTECTION OPERATION USING MODEL-
BASED REASONING 
In recent years engineers and researchers have developed a 
substantial number of protection relay models and tools for 
modelling [19][20][21]. A review of the application of relay 
models by the IEEE Systems Protection Sub-committee of the 
PSRC [19] suggested that these models could be used for 
troubleshooting. By propagating DFR data through an 
appropriate model of the relay in question and then comparing 
the results with the actual behaviour of the relay, engineers 
can confirm whether or not protection operated correctly.  
Earlier research by McArthur et al [8][9] demonstrated how 
this model-based process of evaluating protection behaviour 
could be automated using model-based reasoning (MBR) 
techniques. The General Diagnostic Engine (GDE) [22] was 
extended to validate protection operation [12]. 
PEDA’s PVD agent encapsulates a model-based reasoning 
engine [12] that supports the use of existing protection 
models, created and running on different modelling and 
simulation packages, for diagnosis (Fig. 5). At the time of 
writing the tool-set allows the integration of SIMULINK and 
MATLAB models, Dynamic Protection Models [20] and 
models written in C++ and Java.  
Diagnostic
Engine
MATLAB
Diagnosis
Processed
DFR data
Protection
Component
Model
Library
DPM
 
Fig. 5.  The diagnostic engine draws on a library of protection component 
models in order to validate protection performance 
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SUB A
MP1
SUB A
MP2
SUB A
TR2
SUB A
TR1
SUB B
INT1
SUB B
INT1
CB 1
SUB B
MP1
SUB B
MP2
SUB B
TR2
SUB B
TR1
SUB A
INT1
SUB A
INT1
CB 2
 MP1: 1st Main Protection (unit)
 MP2: 2nd Main Protection (distance)
 TR1: Trip Relay 1
 TR2: Trip Relay 2
 INT1: 1st Intertrip scheme
 INT2: 2nd Intertrip scheme
 CB: Circuit Breaker
Analogue DFR data
from Sub A
Analogue DFR data
from Sub B
 
Fig. 6.  Example protection scheme model 
 
The diagnostic function is achieved by detecting deviation 
from nominal behaviour and identifying components of the 
system whose failure could be logically responsible for the 
deviation. To do this the MBR engine uses a model of 
structure (Fig. 6) and library of models which simulate the 
behaviour of different protection components.  Full details of 
the algorithms the diagnostic engine employs can be found in 
[8][9][12]. 
The MBR approach has a number of advantages. As 
diagnosis is based on knowledge of function rather than 
malfunction, novel faults, i.e. faults never experienced before, 
can be diagnosed. The failure of more than one component of 
the protection scheme is also considered. 
As described above, it allows the reuse of existing 
protection models. The technique is also model agnostic. It 
can employ a range of models from simple models capturing 
static relay characteristics to complex dynamic models with 
model the relay at the circuit board level [20]. 
Ultimately the MBR engine, and thus the PVD agent which 
encapsulates it, produces a protection validation report. The 
protection validation report gives details of the records 
analysed at the final diagnosis. An example diagnosis is, “Trip 
Relay 2 in Substation A failed to operate”. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Multi-agent system technology provides a framework for 
creating open, extensible, distributed hybrid intelligent 
systems. Recent results have demonstrated that MAS 
technology has matured to the point where meaningful 
applications can be developed and installed at utilities. Nearly 
2 years of online experience with the PEDA system is a case 
in point. MAS technology, however, is not a panacea for 
dealing with monitoring data. Classic intelligent systems tools 
and techniques, which had to be tailored for use in the power 
industry, underpin the data analysis activities agents can 
perform.  
 The benefit of the use of agents is that utilities can use this 
technology to build complex data analysis system which give 
a more holistic view of power system operation and 
performance based on all the available data. 
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